Bankrupt firms should reorganize if the wealth created by continuing is expected to exceed the wealth that would be created by liquidating. We examine 89 firms that reorganized in Chapter 11 and find that, despite having sub-standard accounting profitability, nearly 80% created more wealth by continuing rather than liquidating. Even firms that later completed second debt restructurings, on average, should not have liquidated the first time around. Cross-sectional results indicate that firms that complete prepackaged bankruptcies, emerge from bankruptcy with low debt ratios, and that avoid second restructurings are more successful under our performance measure. Among high growth-option firms, those whose net investment exceeds their industry median create more wealth than firms whose net investment is less than their industry median. However, among low growth option firms, superior performance is found among firms that shrink relative to their industry.
Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that many firms perform poorly following bankruptcy reorganization (Gilson (1993) , LoPucki and Whitford (1993) and Hotchkiss (1995) ). One possible interpretation of this evidence is that financial reorganizations are inefficient and that they should be eliminated in favor of forced liquidations (Baird (1986) , Jackson (1986) and Bradley and Rosenzweig (1993) ). This approach is recognized as incomplete, however, because it ignores the influence of various market imperfections on the liquidationcontinuation decision.
For example, an involuntary sale of assets could impose significant liquidation costs on a financially distressed company (Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ). This can occur if the company's assets are traded in a thin secondary market, either because they are highly specialized or because the entire industry is distressed and therefore liquidity-constrained. In these cases, reorganization followed by sub-optimal performance could dominate liquidation as the least costly method of resolving financial distress.
The opportunity to reorganize may also reduce hidden information costs for efficient firms experiencing financial distress. Mooradian (1994) examines the investment policy of distressed firms and shows that Chapter 11 encourages efficient firms to informally restructure their debt and continue, while inefficient firms have the strongest incentive to file for Chapter 11 reorganization. The costs associated with the continuation of inefficient companies are secondary to the benefits which accrue from increased investment by efficient firms.
Liquidation and agency costs therefore lead inefficient firms to reorganize. In light of that fact, analyzing the performance of reorganized firms requires the adoption of a broader definition of success. One possible measure of "success" would require that a firm emerge from bankruptcy, earn a competitive return on investment and grow. Because of agency and liquidation costs, however, a financial reorganization can also be "successful" if a firm emerges from bankruptcy, earns a low return on assets, divests and downsizes, and even files for a second Chapter 11 reorganization, as long as the cash flows to the firm's claimants exceed what they would have been in liquidation. An alternative definition of success that is similar in spirit can be found in Kaplan's (1990) analysis of the Federated Stores bankruptcy.
In this paper we examine the success of a sample of 88 Chapter 11 reorganizations by comparing the accumulated cash flows from the reorganized firms with the cash flows that would have been available from investing the estimated liquidation proceeds of each company in the Standard & Poor's 500. We find that, despite having sub-standard accounting profitability, more than 80% of the sample firms created more wealth by continuing rather than liquidating. Even firms that later completed second debt restructurings, on average, should not have liquidated the first time around. Cross-sectional results indicate that firms that complete prepackaged bankruptcies, emerge from bankruptcy with low debt ratios, and that avoid second restructurings are more successful under our performance measure. Among high growth-option firms, those whose net investment exceeds their industry median create more wealth than firms whose net investment is less than their industry median. However, among low growth option firms, superior performance is found among firms that shrink relative to their industry.
Motivation

Empirical evidence on reorganized firms
LoPucki and Whitford (1993) list several possible definitions of "success" in the reorganization of financially distressed companies: plan confirmation, firm survival, significant debt reduction and avoidance of post-reorganization financial distress. An examination of 43 large, publicly held firms that filed for bankruptcy prior to 1988 displayed mixed results by these standards. Some encouraging signs are evident: ninety-six percent of the plans were confirmed and 74% of the business entities survived the reorganization. These reorganizations appeared less successful, however, when viewed in light of the fact that approximately 50% of the companies reduced their pre-bankruptcy size by over one-half, 76% failed to reduce their debt levels below the industry benchmark and 32% filed for a second Chapter 11 reorganization during the years following the confirmation of the original plan.
Gilson (1993) finds similar results in a sample of 111 firms that completed out-of-court debt restructurings or reorganized under Chapter 11. After recontracting, 80% of the sample firms had a debt ratio in excess of the industry median. One quarter of the firms were required to restructure their debt subsequent to the initial reorganization. 
Theoretical models and delayed liquidation
Mooradian (1994) develops a model of bankruptcy reorganization in which inefficient firms are encouraged to delay liquidation by existing Chapter 11 reorganization laws. The incentive to delay liquidation exists because the shareholders of inefficient firms are awarded a surplus claim in Chapter 11, and choosing reorganization over an immediate asset sale strengthens their bargaining position.
Mooradian extends the model of financial distress and reorganization developed by Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) to examine the effect of asymmetric information on investment policy and debt restructuring in financial distress. This treatment allows for an examination of all distressed firms, not just those which file for formal bankruptcy reorganization. When hidden information problems arise without Chapter 11 reorganization, inefficient firms have an incentive to pool with distressed firms that are efficient. The failure for a separating equilibrium to hold results in the continuation or liquidation of both types of firms on a nonsystematic basis. Chapter 11 reorganization gives distressed firms an incentive to separate by providing the shareholders of inefficient firms a share of the surplus created from reducing overinvestment.
Once in Chapter 11 reorganization, however, the shareholders may be reluctant to liquidate, for two reasons. First, a 100% liquid asset structure would create strong pressure for a settlement of claims according to the absolute priority rule, which would reduce or eliminate the surplus claim of the stockholders. Second, the costs of immediate liquidation could be very high if the secondary market is thin, either because the assets are highly specialized or because the entire industry is distressed and therefore illiquid (Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ).
The main empirical implication of the Mooradian model is that most of the firms that file for Chapter 11 are inefficient, and that those firms will reorganize instead of liquidating immediately. Once reorganized, inefficient firms will create the most value by divesting unprofitable lines and eliminating overinvestment. LoPucki and Whitford (1993) find that nearly all reorganizing firms engage in some form of liquidation, and that partial divestitures occur in many firms after they have emerged from formal bankruptcy protection.
Companies with low liquidation values will find partial or complete liquidation to be costly and therefore unfeasible. Given the uncertainty surrounding the efficiency of the business, however, reorganized firms with high liquidation values can and should weigh the merits of continuation more frequently.
Harris and Raviv (1990) develop a model of capital structure in which debt generates information that can be used to evaluate the liquidation versus continuation decision. Within the context of their model, the apparently high debt levels of reorganized firms are appropriate for both controlling overinvestment and, in the event of default, providing the creditors with a means of forcing the firm into immediate liquidation. Jensen (1989) applies a similar model to leveraged buyouts. As a consequence, the high debt restructuring rate among reorganized firms does not condemn Chapter 11; rather it is merely an outgrowth of the mechanism designed to closely monitor reorganized firms.
Accounting measures of operating performance and legal remedies for the violation of contractual debt obligations are not appropriate means by which to evaluate the success of Chapter 11 reorganizations, because the firms that reorganize are very likely to be inefficient.
If in spite of being inefficient, reorganization is chosen over liquidation, the "success" of a Chapter 11 plan can only be evaluated by comparing the cash flows from reorganization with the cash flows that would have been available under liquidation 1 .
Data and methods
Sample selection
The Of the 106 remaining firms, eleven were excluded from the sample because they are privately held and were unwilling to provide post-reorganization financial statements. Data on six firms is still being gathered, leaving 89 firms suitable for analysis in this draft. We evaluate the operating performance of the sample firms for the first three years following emergence from bankruptcy, using the ratio of operating income to sales. We define operating income as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization We find that the sample of reorganized firms underperformed the firms in their respective industries on the basis of operating profitability. During each of the three fiscal years following emergence from bankruptcy reorganization, at least 60% of the firms with available information reported operating profit margins that fell below the median level for the industry.
Sample characteristics
Thus, our sample is similar to the firms examined by Hotchkiss (1995) in that the majority of firms are performing poorly on an accounting basis.
For example, during the first post-reorganization year, both measures of industry-adjusted operating margin were negative and different from zero at the 5% significance level. The median industry-adjusted ratio of EBITDA/Sales during Year 1 for the sample was -3.32%, with a mean value of -4.78%. Of the 83 sample firms with available information, 57 had EBITDA/Sales ratios that fell below the industry median. Operating performance for the second and third post-reorganization years is qualitatively similar.
Demonstration of methodology: A case study of Resorts International
We demonstrate our method of analyzing the reorganized firms' cash flows by examining in detail the case of Resorts International. Data for this case are contained in Table 3 professionals fees that are not returns to the debt or equity holders of the firm. We subtract the change in cash each year since additions to the firm's cash balance are also not cash flows paid directly to claim holders. We also note whether the firm raised new capital or paid out cash to claim holders when it emerged from bankruptcy.
Panel A of Table 3 reports these figures for Resorts International. The firm raised $11 million in new equity capital when it emerged from bankruptcy, and we account for this as a negative cash flow to claim holders at that date. We also compute the return to continuation using Resorts' estimated going concern value at 9/17/90 as the denominator. Our concern is that firms may have an incentive to understate the liquidation value of their assets in order to convince creditors that the firm is worth keeping alive. 3 Most firms disclose the going concern value of their assets in their bankruptcy plan. 4 This value can be interpreted as the value that the assets would fetch in liquidation if agency and liquidation costs were zero. Resorts' estimated going concern value was $510,040. Had Resorts been able to liquidate costlessly (i.e. for its full going concern value) then the decision to continue meant forgoing $510,040 at 9/17/90. Since total wealth created by 12/31/94 totaled only $473,642, the decision to continue was not a good one by this standard. The annualized return on assets relative to going concern value was (473,642/510,040) 12/51 -1= -1.73%. When compared with the annualized return of 10.02% available on the S&P 500 over this period, the excess return on assets relative to going concern value was -1.73% -10.02% = -11.75%.
Results
Analysis of cash flows
We examined the statement of cash flows for each of the sample firms for up to five years following the year in which the plan of reorganization was confirmed. We take the terminal date of the valuation exercise as the earlier of: 1) the end of the fifth full fiscal year after emerging from bankruptcy; 2) the end of the latest fiscal year prior to 12/31/1995; or 3) the date that the firm was acquired or liquidated after emerging from bankruptcy. We collect the net cash flows from operations, investment and financing activities as well as the change in cash balances and cash interest paid to debt holders during the year. The accumulated value of the reorganized firm is then computed at the terminal date. Total accumulated value is equal to the sum of the intermediate net cash flow to claimholders, reinvested in the S&P 500 index at the end of each year, plus the market value of the company's securities at the terminal date.
The return to continuation relative to liquidation value for a firm is found by annualizing the ratio of the company's reorganized terminal value to its estimated liquidation value.
Similarly, the return to continuation relative to going concern value for a firm is found by annualizing the ratio of the company's reorganized terminal value to its estimated going concern value. Excess returns are computed as the difference between the annualized return to continuation and the annualized return on the S&P 500 index over the same period. Table 4 reports the summary statistics for the annual excess return to continuation for the sample of reorganized companies. For the sample of 89 firms with available information, the annualized return to continuation relative to liquidation value exceeded the return on the market index by an average of 41.7%. The median excess return was 26.1%. Both the mean and median returns are significantly greater than zero at the 1% significance level. The excess return was positive for 70 sample firms, indicating that the return to reorganization exceeded the return on liquidation for nearly 80% of the sample. The evidence indicates that a substantial majority of the sample firms made the correct liquidation/continuation decision.
5
Even if we assume that liquidation is costless (i.e., the firm can liquidate for its full going concern value), we reach a similar conclusion. The second column of Table 4 presents summary statistics for excess returns to continuation relative to going concern value. Fourteen firms did not provide estimates of going concern value, leaving 75 firms with usable data.
Sixty percent of the firms made the right liquidation/continuation decision according to this criterion. The median firm earned a return on assets that was about 4.5% greater than the return available from costlessly liquidating and placing the proceeds in the S&P 500. Since assuming costless liquidation likely vastly overstates the proceeds available from liquidating, it seems clear that we substantially understate the sample firms' performance by using this performance measure. Thus, in what follows we focus strictly on the excess return measure that compares the returns to continuation to the liquidation value of each firm's assets.
The summary statistics presented in Table 4 require two qualifications. First, the excess returns are computed using cash flows to all of the firm's claimholders, not just the cash flow to equity. Since we are comparing the returns earned by the firms to the returns on the S&P 500, the comparison between the returns to reorganization and liquidation is a conservative one -we are requiring the return on a firm's assets to exceed the return on levered equity.
Second, the results in Table 4 may be affected by a selection bias that favors successful companies. As noted earlier, 11 firms were privately held after bankruptcy. While all 11 firms are still in existence at this writing, if private firms systematically perform worse than public firms this will bias performance measures upwards. Also, six firms liquidated after emerging.
We are in the process of tracking down liquidation proceeds for these firms, but it seems likely that some of these firms would have been better off liquidating the first time around. 5 The results in Table 4 are not sensitive to assumptions about the value of the firm's non-traded (bank and trade) debt. For example, we conservatively estimated the value of non-traded debt to be the smaller of 90% of its book value or the value of the firm's traded debt; i.e., if a firm's bonds traded at 75, we assumed that nontraded debt was worth 75 as well. Under these assumptions, the mean excess return was 0.3990, and 69 of the 89 firms (75.3%) had positive excess return measures. Cross-sectional inferences reported in Section 4.2.2 were similarly unaffected.
Cross-sectional evidence
In this section we explore the sources of cross-sectional variation in our performance measure. We first discuss the variables used to explain our performance measure and their expected relationship with post-bankruptcy performance.
• EBITDA to Sales. We test whether a relationship exists between operating cash flow and the excess return to reorganization. As in Hotchkiss (1995) we assign a firm to the group "adjusted EBITDA<0" if industry-adjusted EBITDA/Sales was negative for either the first or second full fiscal year after emerging from bankruptcy.
• Firm acquired. Twenty of the 89 firms were acquired in the years following bankruptcy.
Since in these cases we treat the purchase price of the firm as its terminal value, and since acquired firms are often purchased at a premium, it may be that our performance measure is driven upward by the takeover premiums in these cases.
• HLT. Twenty-one firms conducted highly-leveraged transactions (HLTs), including leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) in the years preceding formal bankruptcy. Jensen (1991) argues that an advantage of the LBO organizational form is that firms have an incentive to reorganize before too much going concern value has been destroyed. If so, then these firms may be well-positioned to perform well after reorganizing their debt.
• Prepackaged bankruptcy. Prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganizations (prepacks) occur when a firm gains acceptance of its bankruptcy plan prior to filing for bankruptcy. The plan is then confirmed during a short stay in bankruptcy that averages less than two months (Betker (1995b)). Existing evidence on prepacks indicates that prepack firms are less economically distressed than traditional Chapter 11 firms. For example, Chatterjee et al (1995) find that prepack firms have better operating performance, but have a higher fraction of their debt due in the short term, compared to firms that file for traditional Chapter 11s. Prepack firms thus have more in common with firms that complete workouts than with firms in Chapter 11. If prepacks are similar to workouts, then they should be predominantly chosen by efficient firms (Mooradian (1994) ). Thus, the post-reorganization performance of prepacks may exceed the post-reorganization performance of firms engaging in traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations.
• Second restructuring. Twenty sample firms restructured their debt a second time after emerging from bankruptcy. We expect that these firms will perform poorly compared to firms that did not restructure again.
• Management change. We next examine performance as a function of management turnover. Hotchkiss (1995) finds that firms that retain their pre-bankruptcy CEO display poorer operating performance than firms which replace their CEO. She interprets this as evidence that the pro-debtor bias in the Bankruptcy Code allows pre-bankruptcy management to continue inefficient investment policies. We define a management change as when the CEO who was in office two years prior to the bankruptcy filing is replaced before or at the date of emergence from bankruptcy.
• Firm size. We control for firm size (log of total assets at emergence from bankruptcy) in case larger firms find it easier to survive in the post-bankruptcy environment.
• Post-bankruptcy debt ratio. We examined performance as a function of the reorganized firm's long-term debt to total capitalization ratio (LTD/TC), using two measures: 1) LTD/TC or 2) industry-adjusted LTD/TC. Gilson (1993) finds that firms tend to emerge from bankruptcy with debt ratios above their industry median. If high debt impairs operating performance (Opler and Titman (1994) ) then these firms may underperform firms with low debt. On the other hand, Alderson and Betker (1995) show that firms with a poor investment opportunity set emerge from bankruptcy with high debt ratios. Thus high debt may proxy for poor growth opportunities. In either case we would expect to see a negative relationship between debt and performance.
• Post-bankruptcy investment. Firms with ample investment opportunities following bankruptcy should outperform firms with an unattractive investment opportunity set. We therefore control for the investment opportunity set in our cross-sectional analysis. Table 5 contains summary data for the sample, stratified along various measures that have the potential to explain cross-sectional variation in the excess return to continuation performance measure.
Summary statistics for subsamples
We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that prepack firms are more efficient than firms emerging from "traditional" Chapter 11. Of the 89 sample firms, 34 reorganized in a prepackaged bankruptcy. The mean excess return for that group was 61% and the median excess return was 40%. These figures are significantly larger than the mean and median excess returns to the non-prepack subsample: 30% and 18%, respectively.
Among the 69 companies that did not restructure subsequent to their reorganization, the mean (median) excess return was 53% (36%). In contrast, for the 20 firms that restructured their debt again, the mean excess return to continuation was only 1%, with a median of zero.
The excess returns to continuation between these two groups were significantly different for both the mean and the median. Although the firms that restructured a second time performed significantly worse than the rest of the sample, there is no evidence to suggest that they systematically should have liquidated the first time around -the average firm still created more wealth by continuing rather than liquidating.
Performance does not systematically differ between firms that retained or replaced their
CEOs. Mean and median excess returns are actually higher among firms that retained their pre-bankruptcy CEOs, but these figures are not significantly different from the mean and median for the firms that replaced their management.
The evidence is also weakly consistent with the claim that firms with lower debt outperform firms with higher debt. However, it must be noted that even among firms with debt ratios above their industry median, both the mean and median performance measures are well above zero. Table 6 contains the results of cross-sectional regressions using the excess return to continuation as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the ones used to stratify the sample in the previous discussion. The results in Table 6 are consistent with the results in Table 5 : firms that complete prepacks, avoid second restructurings, and have relatively low debt ratios show significantly better performance compared to the rest of the sample. We also find that acquired firms outperform firms that were not acquired. In two of the four equations, retention of pre-bankruptcy management is associated with superior post-bankruptcy performance. This last finding is consistent with results in Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1995).
Cross-sectional regression evidence
As noted earlier, the fact that low-debt firms outperform high-debt firms following bankruptcy has several possible interpretations. One is that high debt inhibits the firm from performing as well as its low-debt counterparts. Opler and Titman (1994) show that in an industry downturn, high debt firms lose more sales than low debt firms and conclude that high debt can cause indirect financial distress costs. Another interpretation is that the high debt ratios result from the expectation of relatively poor performance. Alderson and Betker (1995) show that firms that emerge from bankruptcy with high debt tend to be firms with liquidation value of assets that is nearly as great as the going-concern value of the assets. These firms thus have few firm-specific growth opportunities. These firms also tend to emerge from bankruptcy with debt covenants that severely restrict their ability to grow.
We are unable to conclusively show that the (relatively) poor performance of high debt firms is a result of, or a cause of, their high debt ratios. However, given the overwhelmingly positive performance of the high debt subsample (median excess return of 23%, 77% of excess returns exceed zero), we cannot by any means conclude that the debt ratios chosen by the firms were "too high."
In examining the effect of investment on performance we must control for the investment opportunity set facing the firms. Firms with poor investment opportunities should invest less than firms with good investment opportunities. We proxy the investment opportunity set by the firm's liquidation costs, defined as the firm's (going concern value of assets -liquidation value of assets)/going concern value of assets. Firms with high liquidation costs are likely to have an abundance of firm-specific growth options, which by definition cannot be liquidated for their full going concern value (Myers (1977)). Low liquidation cost firms, by contrast, are likely to have few growth options since their assets are worth nearly as much in liquidation as they are in their current use. 6 A portfolio of firms with high liquidation costs is likely to have a more attractive investment opportunity set compared to a portfolio of firms with low liquidation costs.
We therefore examine the effect of investment on performance separately for high and low growth option firms. We look at the highest and lowest quartile of firms sorted on the basis of liquidation costs. Within each quartile we define an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm's net investment cash flows in the first year after bankruptcy (scaled by total assets at year 1) exceed the industry median, and zero otherwise. We also define a variable equal to 1 if the firm's net investment cash flows in the first two years after bankruptcy (scaled by total assets at year 1) exceed the industry median, and zero otherwise. This variable allows us to observe the firm's investment strategy over a longer time period than just the first postbankruptcy fiscal year.
We find that in the low growth option quartile, performance is negatively related to net investment -i.e., in low-growth option industries, firms that shrink relative to their industry outperform firms that grow relative to their industry. This evidence is consistent with the observation that firms with few attractive investment opportunities may prefer to liquidate slowly rather than incur the costs of a forced liquidation while in bankruptcy.
Among high growth option firms, the evidence is stronger when we consider net investment in the first two post-bankruptcy fiscal years. Equations (3) and (4) in Table 6 indicate that high growth option firms that grow relative to their industry outperform firms that invest less than the median firm in their industry.
6 Alderson and Betker (1995) find that liquidation costs can explain the post-bankruptcy capital structures chosen by a sample of reorganized firms. Firms with low liquidation costs choose capital structures with high debt ratios and covenants which severely restrict new investment and the use of free cash flow. This is consistent with the argument that low liquidation cost firms have few good investment opportunities -creditors restrict the ability of managers to make new investments if there are no good investments to make.
Conclusions
Bankrupt firms should reorganize if the wealth created by continuing is expected to exceed the wealth that would be created by liquidating. We examine 89 firms that reorganized in Chapter 11 and find that, despite having sub-standard accounting profitability, nearly 80% created more wealth by continuing rather than liquidating. Even firms that later completed second debt restructurings, on average, should not have liquidated the first time. Crosssectional results indicate that firms that complete prepackaged bankruptcies, emerge from bankruptcy with low debt ratios, and that avoid second restructurings are more successful under our performance measure.
We find that firms' investment behavior following bankruptcy affects their performance, but that this effect depends on the investment opportunity set facing the firm. Among high growth-option firms, those whose net investment exceeds their industry median create more wealth firms whose net investment is less than their industry median. However, among low growth option firms, superior performance is found among firms that shrink relative to their industry. This evidence is consistent with the observation that firms with few attractive investment opportunities may prefer to liquidate slowly rather than incur the costs of a forced liquidation while in bankruptcy. Table 5 . Excess return to continuation compared to liquidation: summary statistics for subsamples.
a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively Notes: Adjusted EBITDA<0: the firm had EBITDA/sales less than the industry median in at least one of the first two years after emerging from bankruptcy. Firm acquired: the firm was acquired within five years of emerging from bankruptcy. HLT: the firm completed a highly leveraged recapitalization prior to its bankruptcy filing. Prepack: the firm's bankruptcy was prepackaged. Second restructuring: the firm completed a second bankruptcy or a workout after emerging from bankruptcy for the first time. Size > sample median: postbankruptcy total assets exceeded the sample median. Management change is 1 if the firm replaced its CEO in the period beginning two years before bankruptcy and ending when the firm emerged from bankruptcy. LTD/TC is the long-term debt to total capitalization ratio. Industry adjusted LTD/TC is the firm's long-term debt to total capitalization less the industry median value. Industry-adjusted Net investment is net investment cash flows for the first two years after bankruptcy divided by total assets at the end of the first year, less the industry median value. Table 6 . Cross sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the excess return to continuation relative to liquidation. See Table 3 for an example of how this figure is computed. t-statistics are in parentheses.
a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively Notes: EBITDA<industry median is 1 if the firm had EBITDA/sales less than the industry median in at least one of the first two years after emerging from bankruptcy. HLT is 1 if the firm completed a highly leveraged recapitalization prior to its bankruptcy filing. Second restructuring is 1 if the firm completed a second bankruptcy or a workout after emerging from bankruptcy for the first time. Management change is 1 if the firm replaced its CEO in the period beginning two years before bankruptcy and ending when the firm emerged from bankruptcy. Industry adjusted LTD/TC is the firm's long-term debt to total capitalization less the industry median value. Net investment is equal to net investment cash flows from the firm's cash flow statement. Growth options are proxied by liquidation costs, defined as (going concern value of asset -liquidation value of (1) 
